Source Notes
Title:
Tools for recreation management in parks: the case of the greater Yellowstone blue-ribbon fishery
Summary:
Joe Kerkvliet (economics department at Oregon State University, Oregon) and Clifford Nowell (economic department at Webster State University, Utah) explain the seriousness of ecological damage by recreationists at Yellowstone blue ribbon fishery. Their analysis also provides possible solutions for these problems including but not limited to site-specific access fees, catch rates and regulations.
Academic.
Analysis.
Topic:
Recreation management at blue ribbon fishery.
Published by Ecology Economics, volume 34, issue 1 on July 6th, 2000.
Joe Kerkvliet and Clifford Nowell.
www.sciencedirect.com
Accessed:
February, 18th, 2009.
Support:
(Directly from bibliography)
Alden, A., 1997. Recreational users management of parks: an ecological economic framework. Ecol. Econom. 23, pp. 225–236.
Bell, F. and Leeworthy, V., 1990. Recreational demand by tourists for saltwater beach days. J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 18, pp. 189–205.
Berrens, R., Bergland, O. and Adams, R., 1993. Valuation issues in an urban recreational fishery: spring chinook salmon in Portland, Oregon. J. Leisure Res. 25, pp. 70–83.
Brown, G. and Mendelson, R., 1984. The hedonic travel cost method. R. Econ. Stat. 66, pp. 427–433.
Cicchetti, C. and Smith, K., 1973. Congestion, quality deterioration and optimal use: wilderness recreation in the Spanish peaks primitive area. Soc. Sci. Res. 2, pp. 15–30.
Caulkins, P., Bishop, R. and Bowles, N., 1986. The travel cost model for lake recreation: a comparison of two methods for incorporating site quality and substitution effects. Am.
J. Ag. Econ. 68, pp. 292–297.
Finley, M., 1997. Welcome and Opening Remarks. Greater Yellowstone Coalition
Conference, Bozeman, MT, USA.
Fisher, A. and Krutilla, J., 1972. Determination of an optimal capacity for resource-based recreation facilities. Nat. Res. J. 12, pp. 417–444.
Franke, M., 1997. A grand experiment. Yellowstone Sci. 5, pp. 8–13.
Graefe, A.F., Kuss, F. and Vaske, J., 1990. Visitor Impact Management: The Planning Framework, National Parks and Conservation Association, Washington, D.C.
Hof, J. and King, D., 1992. Recreational demand by tourists for saltwater beach days: comment. J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 22, pp. 281–291.
Hunsaker, J., Marnell, L. and Scharpe, F., 1970. Hooking mortality of Yellowstone cut-throat trout. Progressive Fish-Culturist. 32, pp. 231–235.
Jacob, G. and Schreyer, R., 1980. Conflict in outdoor recreation: a theoretical prospective. J. Leisure Res. 12, pp. 368–380.
Kuss, F., Graefe, A. and Vaske, J., 1990. Visitor Impact Management: A Review of Research, National Parks and Conservation Association, Washington, DC.
La Pierre, Y., 1994. Taking Stock. National Parks. May/June 35–40.
McCarville, R., Sears, D. and Furness, S., 1999. User and community preferences for pricing park services: a case study. J. Park. Rec. Admin. 17, pp. 91–105.
McClanahan, T., 1990. Viewpoint. Bioscience, 40, January 5.
McConnell, K., 1988. Heterogenous preferences for congestion. J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 15, pp. 251–258.
NationalPark Service (NPS), 1995. Resource Management Plan: Yellowstone National Park March.
Randall, A., 1994. A difficulty with the travel cost methods. Land Econom. 70, pp. 88–96.
Schwartz, S., 1977. Normative Influences on Altruism. In: Berkowitz, L., Editor, , 1977. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Academic Press, Boston, MA.
Schill, D., Griffith, J. and Gresswell, R., 1986. Hooking mortality of cutthroat trout in a catch and release segment of the Yellowstone River, Yellowstone National Park N.A. J. Fisheries Manage. 6, pp. 226–232.
Schneider, I. and Hammitt, W., 1995. Visitor response to outdoor recreation conflict: a conceptual approach. Leisure Sci. 12, pp. 223–234.
Siderelis, C., Brothers, G. and Rea, P., 1995. A boating choice model for lake valuation. J. Leisure Res. 27, pp. 264–282.
Shaw, R., 1991. Recreational demand by tourists for saltwater beach days: comment. J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 20, pp. 284–289.
Shelby, B., Vaske, J. and Harris, R., 1988. User standards for ecological impacts at wilderness campsites. J. Leisure Res. 20, pp. 245–256.
Department of Transportation, US, 1986, Costs of Owning and Operating Automobiles and Vans. Washington, DC.
U.S. Department of Labor, 1992, CPI Annual Report. Washington, DC.
Wilkinson, T., 1995. Crowd Contr. Nat. Parks 69, pp. 36–42.
Joe Kerkvliet (economics department at Oregon State University, Oregon) and Clifford Nowell (economic department at Webster State University, Utah) begin their analysis by discussing the conflict with recreationists and the environment. Alden asserts that “recreationistwho visit and enjoy the planet’s protected natural areas cause serious ecological damage to the very lands they enjoy.” While suggesting site fees to reduce such damage, McCarville reports that residents especially object to activity-specific fees. Discussing the psyche of recreationist, Kuss et. al. claims that self-regulating behavior by recreationist may modify activities that adversely impact other parts of the environment. Wilson claims that “visitation has risen at an annual rate of 3.3% over the past decade. National Park Service anticipates an additional 60–90 million visitors by the year 2000.” McClanahan explains the challenges facing park preservation if internal management allows recreation use to compromise preservation priorities. La Pierre, the former associate editor of National Parks, states: “A growing number of people question the practice of fishing in the parks. Their argument is simple — the harvest of fish by angling is fundamentally at odds withthe mandate of the park service to maintain natural ecosystems in an unimpaired condition.” The NPS has received criticism for the amount of fishing that has occurred at Yosemite National Park. Schill et. al. asserts that’s a staggering number of fish (approximately 9.7) are caught during the 45-day summer season. To factor the efficiency and implications of possible management tools and self-regulation, Kerkvliet and Nowell use a travel cost model Bell and Leeworthy and Hofand King. Economic theory suggests that increases in cost associated with a given site will to lead to decreases in visitation to the site. Jacob and Schreyer were among the first to discuss the normative dimensions of crowding and Schwartz asserts that “social norms are norms that individuals believe are held by the group and dictate appropriate behavior in specific settings.” In recreational fishing, social norms may induce self-regulation by anglers. Shelby et al. (1988)suggest “that rationalization operates strongly for recreation activities that require large expenditures of time or money. If this is the case, major destination fisheries such as the GYE may be poor candidates for displacement by self-regulation.”
Audience & Agenda:
Sciencedirect.com is an academic journal that provides information on scientific, technical, and medical research. The site is funded by subscription and private organizations. Sciencedirect.com is a top 5,000 site (ranking at 1,386) that reaches over 1.2 U.S. monthly people. The site attracts an affluent, more educated group. The typical visitor reads nature.com and visits acs.org.
Usefulness:
The analysis provides me with a counter argument against my original argument. Joe Kerkvliet and Clifford Nowell assert that revenue produced by national forests and parks create more consequences for the some ecosystem , specifically the wildlife at Yosemite, than good for the economy. This analysis suggests that if fees are implemented to parks then there will be a reduction in tourism to that site. This too is a counter argument to my current argument that nature tourism is a benefit for both the economy and the park system.
Works cited:
www.quantcast.com
www.sciencedirect.com
March 13, 2009 at 9:12 am |
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